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If it is to survive, the eurozone can no longer hold private
creditors as sacrosanct above taxpayers, and must crack down
on the fiscal black hole of the EU’s tax havens.
by Blog Admin
Who benefits from the EU’s bailouts of crisis stricken countries? William Oman writes that
international bondholders – the richest five per cent of people – are the true beneficiaries of
bailouts, which amount to fiscal transfers from taxpayers to private creditors. He argues that
the Greek precedent suggests orderly sovereign debt restructurings are possible, and that key
steps towards solving the eurozone crisis should include imposing losses onto bondholders
and cracking down on the EU’s tax havens through policy coordination at the EU level.
What does the ECB bond purchase programme announced by Mario Draghi in September
have to do with French billionaire Bernard Arnault’s application f or Belgian cit izenship only a f ew days later?
Both ref lect a Gordian knot at the heart of  the European Union that makes relatively straightf orward
solutions to the crisis elusive. This Gordian knot is, in turn, the consequence of  two f orces at the heart of
the EU’s f unctioning – or rather, its epic dysf unctions: a creditor protection dogma and a f iscal black hole.
In a word, private creditors and investors are systematically being put bef ore taxpayers, with disastrous
long-run economic, social and polit ical consequences.
Repudiating the creditor protection dogma would allow distressed eurozone countries to solve the problem
of  unsustainable public debt burdens (a stock problem), while tackling the f iscal black hole would help
reduce f iscal def icits (a f low problem). Given the powerf ul vested interests at stake, however, the
prospects of  policymakers identif ying and grappling with these f orces are depressingly dim.
The creditor protection dogma has distorted the way we think about crisis exit  options
One of  the most striking and least well recognised f acts about the crisis is that those who have ult imately
benef ited f rom public EU bailout f unds are not the governments or cit izens of  periphery countries but
international bondholders. The degree of  f inancial concentration in the world today is unprecedented;
bondholders belong to the richest f ive per cent of  people in the world. Yet public bailout money has been
used f irst and f oremost to ensure that bondholders are paid in f ull or with minimal losses. This amounts to
a f iscal transf er f rom taxpayers to private creditors. The cost f or the rest of  society is enormous: austerity
measures in distressed countries have caused unemployment to surge and decades of  welf are
achievements to be scrapped.
The conventional wisdom that bondholders must not bear
losses is a key reason why the crisis has escalated so
dramatically. Fear of  a systemic banking crisis has ensured
that European leaders have consistently ruled out sovereign
restructurings as a way to deal with unsustainable debt
burdens. So f ar, despite large and rising debt burdens across
most of  the eurozone, the only sovereign def ault that has
occurred is the timid Greek restructuring. In f act, one of  the
aims of  the ECB’s bond purchase programme is to make
sovereign restructurings as unlikely as possible. (The plan
entails potentially “unlimited” sovereign bond purchases by the
ECB in exchange f or policy conditionality.) Precisely f or this
reason, the plan is mostly seen (outside of  Germany) as a
step in the right direction.
But is this really the correct way of  thinking about crisis exit options? There are good reasons to think not.
If  we accept the principle that many eurozone countries have real solvency issues that mean that they will
eventually have to restructure their sovereign debt, the question of  who is to bear these losses becomes
crucial. Though the notion that even orderly def ault would cause a systemic banking crisis is widely
accepted, it is highly debatable. As Harald Hau and Ulrich Hege note: “The Greek example has shown how
sovereign debt can be restructured without the market upheaval and contagion predicted by many”. There
are two broader issues with the ECB’s programme. First, because the ECB will remain de f acto senior to
other bondholders, this will inevitably add a premium to the yields of  the bond it purchases f or f ear of
def ault. Hau and Hege point out that: “Ironically, rather than reducing the risk of  sovereign def ault, the
ECB’s bond buying will eventually produce the opposite ef f ect. The larger the scale of  sovereign debt
transf ers f rom domestic investors to the ECB, the less will there be domestic resistance against def ault.
ECB policy might delay sovereign def ault, but does not make it less likely.”
Second, not only is the sacrosanct treatment of  private creditors socially unf air and economically
inef f icient (as Willem Buiter noted back in 2008), it threatens the EU’s democratic legit imacy and credibility.
Putting the taxpayers of  solvent countries on the hook f or the debt of  insolvent ones and f orcing
countries to submit to policy conditionality in exchange f or bond purchases are not polit ically tenable
propositions.
What is the alternative to transf erring losses to eurozone taxpayers? Impose losses on bank shareholders
and bondholders by allowing orderly sovereign restructurings to take place sooner rather than later, and
f orcibly recapitalise banks, notably by using the new European Stability Mechanism. To be sure, bank and
investor lobbies will f ight tooth and nail against this solution. Yet what is at stake is nothing less than the
eurozone’s survival. Either private creditors are made whole, or the eurozone survives. Europe must
choose. Even if  early sovereign debt restructurings do take place, they would only address part of  the
problem (the stock) and leave the f low problem unaddressed. On this f ront, the binding constraint is the
f iscal black hole.
Bernard Arnault  and Europe’s f iscal black hole
The f iscal black hole guarantees the continued prosperity of  tax havens at the heart of  the EU – f rom
Luxembourg and Belgium to Austria, Ireland and the UK. These deprive EU countries of  vital tax revenue and
create destructive competit ion among them. David Cameron’s promise to “roll out the red carpet” f or French
tax exiles is a case in point.
Arnault’s (France’s – and Europe’s – richest man) application f or Belgian cit izenship last week (Belgium has
a bank secrecy policy and very low inheritance taxes) is a shocking illustration of  the ease with which the
wealthiest people in Europe evade national f iscal authorit ies – without even having to leave the EU.
Individuals who have benef ited the most f rom European integration are using the extensive means at their
disposal to shirk their social and moral responsibilit ies in the midst of  an historic f iscal crisis. Tax havens
are helping exiles evade taxes, and the EU is helping tax havens evade scrutiny.
This f iscal black hole creates a tilted playing f ield and prevents EU countries f rom coordinating on
corporate and other tax rates. With countries scrambling to cut their def icits, and enormous wealth (which
mostly belongs to high net worth Eurozone cit izens) sitt ing – hidden – at the very heart of  the EU, an EU-
level crackdown on tax havens would be a powerf ul tool to raise substantial tax revenues without
signif icantly hurting economic growth. These new tax revenues would signif icantly reduce the need f or
growth-killing and self -def eating f iscal austerity, which af f ects the average cit izen f ar more than the well
of f , creating social unrest and f eeding polit ical disenchantment and the rise of  populist, anti-EU parties.
How big is this f iscal black hole? By all accounts, it is gigantic. According to an edif ying 2012 study by
Gabriel Zucman, “The Missing Wealth of  Nations”, around 8 per cent of  global household wealth is held in
tax havens. As of  the end of  2008, this amounted to about $6 trillion. A 2012 study by the Tax Justice
Network puts this number at $21 trillion by the end of  2010. According to the study, this of f shore f ortune
belongs to f ewer than 10 million people, and almost half  of  it belongs to f ewer than 100,000 people. Af ter
taking unrecorded of f shore wealth into account, it appears that Europe as a whole is a net creditor – which
makes sense given that it is a rich, old, ageing region with a relatively high savings rate. If  these hidden
sources of  wealth can be tapped, the f iscal equation changes dramatically.
National and EU policymakers’ lack of  will and coordination in cracking down on of f shore centres has f or
decades allowed – and encouraged – extremely wealthy individuals to break the law. If  polit icians and
regulators decided to put serious pressure on of f shore centres to end bank secrecy in a coordinated way,
the secrecy would likely end, the amounts being hidden would be revealed, thereby making it possible to
raise large amounts of  new tax revenue. Wealthy individuals would no doubt f ind other schemes to hide
their wealth, but it would become much harder f or them to do so.
The importance of cutt ing the Gordian knot
The challenges f aced by the EU are Herculean. The sums involved are huge and rising. They range in the
hundreds of  billions, if  not trillions, of  euros. Yet straightf orward options do exist. A new perspective – a
gestalt shif t – would bring new options to the table. Eventually, something is going to have to give.
Although anathema to policymakers (and even more so to private creditors), it is hard to envisage a
solution that does not involve orderly sovereign debt restructuring. Clearly, the public debt dynamics of
several large eurozone countries are not sustainable. Passing on the buck of  these restructurings to
eurozone taxpayers is not only unf air and inef f icient, it risks jeopardising the entire euro project by
weakening its democratic legit imacy. If  European cit izens f eel that they are being cheated repeatedly and
losing their ability to inf luence decisions that af f ect them in a big way, notably through polit ics and the
democratic process, their support f or Europe will wane.
Schopenhauer wrote that: “All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently
opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self -evident.” The need f or early and orderly sovereign debt def ault
– with losses imposed on private creditors rather than taxpayers – is one such idea. The need to f inally
crack down on tax havens at the European level is another. Either or both of  these ideas may have reached
the point of  transit ion between the f irst and second of  Schopenhauer’s stages. Let us hope they reach the
third stage bef ore it is too late. Then again, as John Galbraith quipped: “The enemy of  the conventional
wisdom is not ideas but the march of  events.”
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